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MUCH UNCERTAINTY ABOUT UNCERTAIN TAX POSITIONS
By: Robert D. Probasco 1
Internal Revenue Service (the “Service” or “IRS”) Commissioner Douglas Shulman
stunned his audience at the January 26th annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association
Tax Section with the disclosure of a new proposal, spelled out in Announcement 2010-9 2 (the
“Announcement”) released the same day. The Service plans to require certain large businesses to
report “uncertain tax positions” on a new schedule filed with their annual tax returns.
Shulman explained the proposal as intended to increase efficiency: “Today, we spend up to
25 percent of our time in a large corporate audit searching for issues rather than having a
straightforward discussion with the taxpayer about the issues.” The Service believes that the new
disclosure requirement will “help us prioritize selection of issues and taxpayers for examination.”
Rather than relying on auditors to identify items that might be in error, the proposal will require
taxpayers to affirmatively point out the weak points in their returns, those that are most susceptible
to challenge. As a result, the Service will be able to collect more taxes with fewer resources.
The Service subsequently issued Announcement 2010-30 3 on April 19, 2010, with a draft of
the proposed Schedule UTP, Uncertain Tax Positions Statement, and related instructions. The draft
schedule and instructions clarify some of the mechanical aspects of the new requirement but still
leave many open issues and questions.

The Background – Financial Statement Reserves
In June 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued FASB Interpretation No.
48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, an Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 109
(“FIN 48”). 4 FIN 48 establishes a two-stage process of determining whether the taxpayer must
establish a tax reserve. In the first step, the taxpayer must reserve 100% of the tax position unless
it is more likely than not, based on the technical merits, that the position reported on the return
would be sustained if the taxpayer litigated the issue to the court of last resort. 5 This determination
is based on application of relevant legal authorities to the facts and circumstances and presumes
that the Service audits the return and has full knowledge of all relevant information. 6 If the
Service’s past administrative practices and precedents, in its dealings with the taxpayer or similar
enterprises, are widely understood, those are considered as well. 7 Thus, even if a tax position is
technically incorrect, the taxpayer would not have to reserve 100% of it if the Service’s practice is
to allow it when and if examined. 8
If a tax position is more likely than not correct, the second step in the FIN 48 process is the
determination of how much, if any, of the tax benefits must be reserved in the taxpayer’s financial
statements. The taxpayer must reserve any amount of the total tax benefit in excess of the largest
amount that is greater than 50% likely of being realized upon ultimate settlement with the Service.9
Unless the probability is greater than 50% that the Service would concede the entire amount at
issue, a reserve would be required for the financial statements. The second step in the FIN 48
process takes into account the likelihood that the taxpayer will settle rather than litigate. That
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determination is based on the amount the taxpayer would ultimately accept in a settlement with the
Service, and therefore may well be less than 100% of the tax benefit even though it is more likely
than not that the taxpayer would prevail in full by litigating. 10
Thus, the taxpayer generally must establish a reserve in its financial statements for part or
all of the tax benefit from the position unless it is more likely than not that the Service would fully
concede the issue prior to litigation. Although Appeals normally will not demand concessions
based on “nuisance” value, it is unlikely that the Service will fully concede the issue unless it
assesses the probability that the taxpayer would prevail in litigation as at least 80%. (This is
consistent with our understanding of the “should” degree of confidence at which accounting firms
typically do not require a reserve for financial reporting purposes.) With some exceptions,
therefore, the taxpayer has to establish a reserve in its GAAP financial statements for the position
unless it is more likely than not that the Service would conclude it had no reasonable basis (roughly
less than a 20% chance of success) for contesting the position taken on the return.
FIN 48’s requirements apply only to items that are material with respect to the financial
statements. The definition of a tax position also depends on the level of detail at which individual
items are aggregated into a “tax position.” FIN 48 addresses the level of aggregation through a
concept described as “unit of account” and defined as follows:
The appropriate unit of account for determining what constitutes an individual tax
position . . . is a matter of judgment based on the individual facts and circumstances
of that position evaluated in light of all available evidence. The determination of the
unit of account to be used . . . shall consider the manner in which the enterprise
prepares and supports its income tax return and the approach the enterprise
anticipates the taxing authority will take during an examination. 11
The taxpayer’s financial statements do not show the amount of reserve by individual tax
position, only an aggregate amount. Taxpayers routinely prepare supporting documentation for the
tax reserves that show such detail. These “tax accrual workpapers” normally contain not only a
description of the relevant facts but also identification of potential Service arguments, legal
analysis, and assessment of the risks and most likely settlement amount. The tax accrual
workpapers could provide the Service not only with a list of the most vulnerable positions to audit
but also negotiating leverage from knowing the taxpayer’s evaluation of the strength of its case.
The Service has a “policy of restraint,” however, that limits the circumstances under which
it will request the taxpayer’s tax accrual workpapers. Currently, the Service’s policy12 is to request
tax accrual workpapers:
x
x
x

If the tax return claims any tax benefit from a listed transaction that was properly disclosed,
only the tax accrual workpapers pertaining to that listed transaction.
If the tax return claims any tax benefit from a listed transaction that was not properly
disclosed, or benefits from multiple investments in a listed transaction (whether disclosed or
not), all tax accrual workpapers.
In unusual circumstances when additional facts are required for a specific identified issue
but could not be obtained from the taxpayer’s other records or from available third parties.
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When the Service does request tax accrual workpapers, the request may lead to fierce disputes and
litigation when the taxpayer asserts privileges against disclosure. 13
This is the background against which the Service issued the Announcement. Speaking at
the March 5th meeting Federal Bar Association Section on Taxation Tax Law Conference, IRS
Chief Counsel William Wilkins explained that the proposed disclosures were not an outgrowth of a
recent favorable court decision concerning the application of privileges to requests for tax accrual
workpapers. Instead, he characterized it as a natural result of the accounting rules regarding
companies’ tax reserves, such as FIN 48. The information now being sought is available. Because
the Service doesn’t consider the information to be privileged, there is no reason not to ask for it.

The Proposal
What Positions Would Be Reported
The Announcement and the draft instructions for Schedule UTP define uncertain tax
positions as:
x
x
x

Positions for which the taxpayer or a related entity has recorded a reserve in its financial
statements under FIN 48 or other generally accepted accounting standards;
Positions for which a tax reserve is not required because the taxpayer expects to litigate
(and win) the position; and
Positions for which a tax reserve is not required because the taxpayer has determined that
the Service has an administrative practice not to challenge the position.

The instructions for Schedule UTP indicate that it would be based on the same materiality
and level of aggregation (“unit of account” in FIN 48) standards as used in the financial statements.
Thus, the items reported should be the same as those recorded in the company’s reserves for
financial accounting. 14 For uncertain tax positions for which no reserve was recorded (because the
taxpayer intends to litigate or determined the Service has an administrative practice not to
challenge the position), the Service apparently intends taxpayers to apply the same materiality and
level of aggregation standards.
Who Would Be Required to Report
The business taxpayers subject to the requirement are those with total assets in excess of
$10 million, with one or more positions of the type required to be reported on the new schedule. It
includes taxpayers who prepare financial statements themselves, or are in included in the financial
statements of a related entity, if the financial statements determine United States federal income tax
reserves under FIN 48 or other accounting standards. For now, the requirement is limited to
corporations that file Forms 1120, 1120 F, 1120 L, or 1120 PC.
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Timing and Transition Rules
Taxpayers would be required to file Schedule UTP starting with 2010 tax returns filed in
2011. The schedule has different sections to list uncertain tax positions for the current year and for
prior years and the instructions include timing and transition rules.
x
x

x
x

Uncertain tax positions taken in tax years beginning before December 15, 2009 need not be
reported regardless of whether or when a reserve was recorded. 15
If the taxpayer makes the decision to record a reserve at least 60 days before filing a tax
return, the uncertain tax position must be reported on that tax return. It will be reported on
Schedule UTP either in Part I (if the position was taken in that year’s tax return) or Part II
(if the position was taken in an earlier year’s tax return).
If the taxpayer makes the decision to record a reserve less than 60 days before filing a tax
return, the taxpayer has the option to report it on Schedule UTP either on that tax return or
the return for the next tax year.
A taxpayer takes an uncertain tax position in each year for which there would be an
adjustment to a line item on that return if the position is not sustained. Thus, some
uncertain tax positions will be taken in multiple years. The taxpayer is required to report
the uncertain tax position once and only once for each year in which it takes the position.

What Would Be Reported
Taxpayers would report, for each uncertain tax position:
x
x
x
x
x
x

The primary Internal Revenue Code sections relating to the tax position, to a maximum of
three.
Indication whether the uncertain tax position relates to a timing difference, and whether the
difference is temporary or permanent.
The EIN of a pass-through entity, if the corporation’s tax position relates to a tax position
of the pass-through entity.
Indication whether the tax position is one for which no reserve is recorded because of the
Service’s administrative practices.
The maximum tax adjustment, or a ranking of those items that are valuation or transfer
pricing tax positions.
A concise description of the tax position, including:
o A statement that the positions involves an item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or
credit against tax.
o A statement whether the position involves a determination of the value of any
property or right or a computation of basis.
o The rationale for the position.
o The reasons for determining the position is uncertain.

Maximum Tax Adjustment
One of the primary concerns of tax practitioners has been the computation of the maximum
tax adjustment (MTA). It was not clear exactly how that should be determined to provide the most
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useful information to the Service without providing risk assessment information.
The
Announcement, for example, requested input on whether the amount reported should be only for
the tax period for which the return is filed or for all tax periods to which the position relates, and
whether the determination should take into account net operating losses or excess credits. In
addition, while the MTA might be determined in some instances simply from the effect of totally
disallowing a deduction or loss, in other situations the maximum adjustment might be
indeterminate. This might occur, for example, with many valuation or transfer pricing issues. If
the taxpayer values something too high, the MTA might be based on changing the value of $0. If
the taxpayer obtains a tax benefit from valuing something too low, however, there may be no
logical or clear answer to the maximum value on which the MTA might be based.
The Service has resolved most of these issues, for now, in the draft Schedule UTP and
instructions. The MTA is determined on an annual basis. For tax positions other than valuation or
transfer pricing tax positions, the MTA is: (1) the total amount of an item of credit; and/or (2) the
total amount of items of income, gain, loss, or deduction multiplied by an effective tax rate of 35%.
Interest and penalties are not included, and items may not be offset other than by other items
relating to the same tax position.
For valuation and transfer pricing tax positions, the Service provided another approach.
Taxpayers are not required to report a specific amount as with other positions. Instead, the
taxpayer reports the relative ranking of all valuation positions and the relative ranking of all
transfer pricing positions. The taxpayer has a choice of basing the ranking on either: (a) the
amount recorded as a reserve in the financial statements; or (b) the estimated adjustment to tax
liability, computed as described above, if the tax position is not sustained. The taxpayer need not
disclose the method chosen or the relative amounts used to rank the positions.
Concerns and Open Issues
The Service requested comments on the proposal by June 1, 2010, and has stated that there
may be further changes based on those comments or as the proposal evolves. There are several
open issues or areas of concern to many taxpayers and tax practitioners. Some of the most
significant are as follows.
Practical Effect
Tax positions are uncertain for a number of reasons. As Commissioner Shulman recognized
in recent comments to the Tax Executives Institute Midyear Conference, these reasons may include
ambiguity in the law and a lack of public guidance on issues. An uncertain tax position may, and
often will, simply reflect the taxpayer’s honest effort to apply the tax law correctly rather than an
aggressive interpretation of the law in the face of contrary guidance or caselaw. Often, the correct
resolution will be no adjustment at all. It is clear from public pronouncements that top
management at the Service understands this and does not intend that Exam automatically propose
adjustments for all listed positions. However, there is reason for concern whether management’s
expectations will translate into reality.
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Under FIN 48, the taxpayer generally must establish a reserve in its financial statements for
part or all of the tax benefit from the position unless it is more likely than not that the Service
would fully concede the issue prior to litigation. Service personnel will know, simply from the fact
that a position is listed on the schedule, that the taxpayer determined it probably would have to
concede at least a partial adjustment if the Service challenges the position. These positions will
appear to be easy sources of additional tax collections, based on the taxpayers’ own assessments.
Also, Congress, the Executive Branch, the media, and the general public may not have the same
understanding as the Service that an uncertain tax position is often completely proper, and they
could react negatively to a perception that uncertain tax positions are not always challenged. It
seems unlikely that Exam and Appeals would develop issues and analyze positions in the same
manner as before, in the face of the changed circumstances and foreseeable pressures. There is a
significant potential for overly aggressive use of the additional information provided, in a manner
inconsistent with management’s expectations, that could strain the Service’s resources for handling
taxpayer protests and litigation. Communicating management’s expectations regarding use of the
additional information alone may not be enough to avoid this potential disruption. Significant
efforts to provide extensive training, align incentives, and monitor performance will be critical to
the successful implementation of this program.
It will also be necessary to quickly and efficiently identify and resolve common issues.
Exam may have enough published guidance and other authority to resolve many of the uncertain
tax positions but other positions may be uncertain because of the lack of such authority. A
thoughtful review and evaluation of the latter may require extensive coordination at National
Office. As with other issues identified in the field, such coordination will help avoid wasteful
duplication of effort and promote consistency. Depending on the volume of disclosures, however,
the amount of time and effort required may well increase significantly.
It is not clear whether the Service has the administrative capacity to use the additional
information appropriately. Given the potential difficulties and disruption from implementation of
this new requirement, some practitioners have recommended that the Service give serious
consideration to delaying implementation until it can conduct a pilot program to test how the
process translates from theory to practice.
Privilege and Waiver
The proposed disclosure requirement appears to be intended as a de facto compromise in
requesting sensitive information from taxpayers. Schedule UTP requires less information that is
available in tax accrual workpapers. However, the proposal still creates serious concerns regarding
privilege and waiver. The Service concludes that the information sought is not protected by
privilege but many taxpayers and tax practitioners disagree. In particular, there could be serious
questions about whether the work-product doctrine applies to the information requested. That
privilege illustrates some specific objectionable aspects of the proposal. 16
The Supreme Court first articulated the work-product doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor, 17 and
the Advisory Committee incorporated it into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970. 18 It
generally protects from discovery “documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative.” 19 Although that protection
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may be overcome on a showing of substantial need, courts are directed to “protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney
or other representative.” 20 In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 21 the Supreme Court recognized that the
protection is much stronger with respect to such opinion work-product 22 and some courts have held
that the protection is nearly absolute. 23
Schedule UTP primarily focuses on factual information about tax positions, rather than
opinion work product often contained in tax accrual workpapers, such as the analysis of possible
arguments and an overall assessment of the relative strength of the position and the hazards of
litigation. However, there are aspects of the information requested that arguably constitute opinion
work product.
First, the inclusion of a tax position on the schedule does not disclose the taxpayer’s exact
risk assessment, but it does demonstrate that the taxpayer assesses the risk as high enough that the
Service probably would not fully concede the issue. This is a limited disclosure but arguably it is
still opinion work product. Second, and more important, the proposal requests “a concise general
statement of the reasons for determining that the position is an uncertain position.” Similarly, the
draft instructions include, as part of the concise description in Part III of the schedule, “the reasons
for determining the position is uncertain.” It is difficult to interpret this as asking for anything
other than the taxpayer’s assessment of the relative weaknesses of that position, since that
assessment drives the decision to record a reserve for an uncertain tax position. All three examples
given in the draft instructions are consistent with this interpretation that the Service is requesting
the taxpayer’s “conclusions, opinions, or legal theories,” that is, opinion work product.
Taxpayers have legitimate concerns about the disclosure of opinion work product as well as
the possibility that the Service could later argue that the disclosures constitute broad subject matter
waivers of any privilege. The possibility of waiver is particularly troublesome as the waiver, if it is
such, would result automatically from the required disclosures. This could essentially eliminate the
privilege altogether for any such uncertain tax positions. In the context of requests for tax accrual
workpapers, taxpayer concerns over privilege and waiver often lead to costly and time-consuming
litigation to resolve the dispute. Although the proposed disclosures are less intrusive than a request
for tax accrual workpapers, they are also being directed at a much larger population of taxpayers.
As the proposal is structured, there is a significant possibility of dramatic increases in government
resources required to litigate privilege disputes.
There are several possible changes to the proposal that could alleviate most taxpayers’
concerns. First, the Service might confirm that the government will not take the position that the
disclosures constitute a broad subject matter waiver of any privileges to which the taxpayer is
entitled and that the disclosure requirements do not alter the otherwise applicable law relating to
such privileges. This may be the Service’s intent but taxpayers would be reassured by a formal
commitment.
Second, a change to the Service’s policy of restraint regarding tax accrual workpapers
would be appropriate. In various public statements, Service personnel have stated that the Service
would not, as a result of the new program, modify the policy of restraint to request additional tax
accrual workpapers in circumstances other than those now authorized. That is, the Service will not
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request tax accrual workpapers based solely on the disclosures on Schedule UTP. This is welcome
news but it would be appropriate for the Service to further restrict the circumstances in which tax
accrual workpapers are requested. Specifically, the Service should explicitly modify the policy of
restraint to prohibit such workpaper requests of any taxpayer that complies with the new disclosure
requirement. Although the Service may need additional facts about some of the uncertain tax
positions, those can easily be obtained through normal channels in the course of the audit once the
position has been identified. The only other information in the tax accrual workpapers would be
the taxpayer’s analysis and risk assessment. Under ordinary circumstances, there is no legitimate
purpose for the Service to have that information.
Third, the Service should eliminate from the information to be disclosed the “concise
general statement of the reasons for determining that the position is an uncertain tax position” or
“reasons for determining the position is uncertain.” If the reasons are factual in nature and
unknown to the Service, such a request may be appropriate, but the information likely can be
obtained as easily through normal channels during the audit rather than on the proposed schedule.
If the reasons are legal in nature, they arguably fall within the realm of opinion work product. In
addition, in the experience of most taxpayers and tax practitioners, once the Service has the
relevant facts it has no difficulty identifying the arguments that could be used to challenge a tax
position. This information adds minimal value to the Service while raising significant privilege
concerns for the taxpayer and therefore should not be requested.
Some taxpayers and tax practitioners are making such recommendations to the Service.
Whether the proposal will be modified accordingly remains to be seen.
Penalties
The Announcement stated that the Service “is also evaluating additional options for
penalties or sanctions to be imposed when a taxpayer fails to make adequate disclosure of the
required information regarding its uncertain tax positions. One option being considered is to seek
legislation imposing a penalty for failure to file the schedule or to make adequate disclosure.” It is
still unclear whether the Service will seek a new penalty, rather than relying on existing penalties,
and how any new penalty might be designed.
Other Disclosure Requirements
The draft instructions state that taxpayers need not file Form 8275, Disclosure Statement, or
Form 8275-R, Regulation Disclosure Statement, for any tax positions disclosed on Schedule
UTP. 24 The Service has not, as yet, addressed whether Schedule UTP might also replace other
disclosure requirements, such as Form 8082, Notice of Inconsistent Treatment, or Form 8886,
Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement, or Schedule M-3. More importantly, the Service has
not yet addressed whether listing an item on Schedule UTP will be considered adequate disclosure
for purposes of various penalties or statute of limitations provisions, including:
x
x

Accuracy-related penalties, Section 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I)
Reasonable cause exception for reportable transaction understatements, Section
6664(d)(2)(A)
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x
x
x

Extension of statute of limitations for undisclosed listed transaction, Section
6501(c)(10)
Extension of statute of limitations for substantial omission of income, Section
6501(e)(1)(A)(ii)
Extension of statute of limitations for substantial omission of income, Section
6229(c)(2) 25

The purpose of most such provisions is to encourage sufficient disclosure for the Service to decide
whether to examine an item. Clearly, listing an item on Schedule UTP will frequently, if not
always, prompt the Service to consider additional investigation and provide the Service with fair
warning of questionable items on the return. Listing a tax position on Schedule UTP should be
considered “adequate disclosure” for the above and similar provisions seems entirely appropriate.

Conclusion
The effect of the proposed requirement remains unclear. The Service is still awaiting
comments and considering changes. Even when the requirement is finalized, some experience with
it will be necessary to determine how taxpayers implement it and how the Service uses the new
information. At this point, though, it appears likely to be the most significant transformation in
years of the tax reporting process and the relationship between the Service and taxpayers.

1

Mr. Probasco practices law with Thompson & Knight, LLP in Dallas, Texas.
2010-7 I.R.B. 408. The Service subsequently issued Announcement 2010-17, 2010-13 I.R.B. 515, to extend the
deadline for comments and request input on three additional questions.
3
2010-19 I.R.B. ___.
4
As a result of the FASB codification project, the relevant portions of FIN 48 are now contained in FASB ASC 74010.
5
FIN 48 ¶¶ 6, A2.
6
Id. ¶ 7.
7
Id. ¶ 7.b.
8
Examples are at id. ¶¶ A12-A15, including a policy under which assets that cost less than $2,000 are deducted
immediately rather than being capitalized.
9
Id. ¶ 8.
10
If the taxpayer determines that it will not accept anything less than a full concession by the Service, and will litigate
if necessary, it may avoid the need to establish a tax reserve for that position for financial reporting. However, as
discussed below, such positions would still be reported under the Service’s new proposal.
11
Id. ¶ 5.
12
Announcement 2002-63, 2002-2 C.B. 72; I.R.M. 4.10.20 (Jul. 12, 2004).
13
See, e.g., United States v. Textron, 553 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S. Law Weekly (Dec.
24, 2009) (No. 09-750).
14
In public pronouncements, Service management has denied any intention to second-guess taxpayers’ decisions
regarding the reserves in their financial statements.
15
This also applies to tax years beginning on or after December 15, 2009, if the tax year ends before January 1, 2010.
2

76530249.1

Page 9

16

Although the following discussion focuses on the work-product doctrine, taxpayers and tax practitioners have
similar concerns about other privileges.
17
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
18
This provision governs discovery proceedings in federal court, but the work-product doctrine is not limited to that
context. Courts have also analyzed it in IRS summons enforcement actions.
19
Fed. R. Civ. P. 2b(b)(3)(A).
20
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B).
21
449 U.S. 383 (1981).
22
Id. at 401-2. “[W]e think a far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by other means . . . would be
necessary to compel disclosure” of such opinion work-product.
23
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 220 F.R.D. 130, 145 (D. Mass. 2004) and cases cited therein.
24
These forms are used for items or positions not otherwise adequately disclosed, in order to avoid accuracy-related
penalties.
25
Although this section does not specifically mention adequate disclosure as an exception to the extension of the
statute of limitations, the Service has interpreted it in that manner. See FSA 199925016 and cases collected in CC&F
Western Operations Limited Partnership v. Comm’r, 273 F.3d 402 (1st Cir. 2001).
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